Sector-based explanation of vertical integration in distribution systems; Evidence from France by Chaudey, Magali et al.
Sector-based explanation of vertical integration in
distribution systems; Evidence from France
Magali Chaudey, Muriel Fadairo, Gwennae¨l Solard
To cite this version:
Magali Chaudey, Muriel Fadairo, Gwennae¨l Solard. Sector-based explanation of vertical inte-
gration in distribution systems; Evidence from France. Working paper GATE 2011-36. 2011.
<halshs-00654848>
HAL Id: halshs-00654848
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00654848
Submitted on 23 Dec 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
GROUPE D’ANALYSE ET DE THÉORIE ÉCONOMIQUE  LYON ‐ ST ÉTIENNE   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W P 1136 
 
  
Sector‐based explanation of vertical integration in 
distribution systems: Evidence from France 
 
Magali Chaudey, Muriel Fadairo, Gwennaël Solard 
 
Décembre 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
oc
um
en
ts
 d
e 
tr
av
ai
l |
 W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon‐St Étienne 
 
93, chemin des Mouilles  69130 Ecully – France 
Tel. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60  
Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
 
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint‐Etienne cedex 02 – France  
Tel.  +33 (0)4 77 42 19 60 
Fax. +33 (0)4 77 42 19 50 
 
Messagerie électronique / Email :  gate@gate.cnrs.fr 
Téléchargement / Download : http://www.gate.cnrs.fr  – Publications / Working Papers 
 
 
1 
 
e 
Sector-based explanation of vertical integration in 
distribution systems; Evidence from France 
 
 
Magali CHAUDEY• . Muriel FADAIRO• . Gwennaël SOLARD© 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Based on recent data concerning the French distribution networks in retail and services, this paper 
highlights several stylized facts relating to the sector-based differences in the organizational choices. 
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analytical framework derived from the theory of contracts, and evidence for the French case. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The issue of sector-based differences in the organization of distribution networks was raised in one 
of the first empirical investigations dealing with franchising: Caves and Murphy (1976)’s seminal 
article. Yet this remains a marginal issue within the vast econometrical literature on franchising data. 
However, distribution networks, as franchise systems, concern a diversity of retail sectors. 
Recent empirical works of the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies 
(INSEE) highlight main sector-based differences in the organization of networks concerning the level 
of vertical integration (X.  Reif, G. Solard, 2009 ; B. Mura, 2010). A network relates to a network of 
downstream firms using the brand-name of an upstream one. Several types of contracts involving 
more or less integration may organize the vertical relationship. According to the dominant type of 
contract, different kinds of chains can be distinguished. In addition, a mix of vertical relationships may 
occur within the same network. 
Three stylized facts concerning the French distribution systems are at the roots of this paper: i) 
sector-based differences relating to the level of vertical integration, ii) a sector specific type of 
dominant contract, iii) three main organizational forms: groupments, franchised networks, integrated 
networks. 
As with franchising and integrated networks, the units of a groupment share a same brand, but the 
vertical relationships are based on centralized purchases of the downstream units. With franchising the 
upstream firm transmits his business format and monitors the downstream units to maintain the 
network reputation. Integrated networks involve managers for the retail units instead of independent 
business owners as with groupments and franchised networks. 
The purpose of this paper is to answer the following question: why is the integration level different 
amongst sectors? The integration level is studied in two ways:  i) taken into account the fact that some 
vertical contracts involve more integration than the others, and ii) considering the part of owned units 
in networks. In other words, the driving question of this paper is as follows: is the Economic analysis 
able to explain the sector-based differences concerning the organization of distribution networks; or do 
these divergences have other kinds of explanations (historical, legal…)? 
The originality of our empirical investigation relies on the sector-based approach, the focus on 
distribution networks and not only on franchising networks, and a unique dataset gathering recent and 
good quality primary French data from the INSEE. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 highlights the stylized facts on French data. Section 3 
surveys the economic explanations of dual distribution and of vertical integration in distribution 
systems in order to derive some testable propositions relating to the sector-based differences. Section 4 
presents the sample and empirical specifications. The estimations are contained in sections 5. Section 
6 concludes. 
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II. Stylized facts 
 
The INSEE has conducted several surveys that collect information on networks composed of seven 
or more retail or services outlets. These surveys highlight the heterogeneity of retail trade and service 
activity sectors. These sectors differ on the importance of networks, the dominant organizational 
forms, and the level of vertical integration… In 2007, the survey dataset is made of 1 594 networks in 
the retail trade sector and the service activity sector. These networks are composed of 170 500 outlets.  
 
II.1 Three main organizational forms in the French distribution systems 
 
The outlets and the upstream firm can be linked by different kinds of relationship (table 1 and 
appendix). In the most common one, the outlets belong to the upstream firm or to one of its 
subsidiaries (37 % of outlets in networks). The second organizational form is the franchise (23 % of 
outlets in networks). In the third one, the outlets are members of a groupment (17 % of outlets in 
networks). The outlets linked by one of these three organizational forms realized 92 % of the turnover 
of networks (respectively 56 %, 11 % and 25 %). The other kinds of relationship are rather 
uncommon. These are: brand licence (10 % of outlets in network), concession (5%), affiliation and 
commission-based affiliation (3 %), and lease-management (1 %). In 2007, these organizational forms 
represent only 8 % of the turnover of networks. 
 
 
Table 1- Relationship between outlet and upstream firm 
Relationship between outlet and upstream firmNumber of outlets Turnover (million euros) 
Integrated 62 896 200 319
Franchise 39 267 37 730
Groupment 28 333 87 084
Brand Licence 17 029 8 717
Concession 8 819 7 744
Affiliation 5 506 3 092
Commission-based affiliation 4 784 4 030
Other 2 070 1 383
Lease-management 1 785 3 218
Total 170 488 353 318
Data from INSEE surveys on retail networks 2006-2007, INSEE survey on service networks 2008. 
 
More than half (53 %) of networks are linked by the same relationship with all of their outlets. The 
other networks mix several kinds of relationship. For instance, franchising networks have to mix 
integrated and franchising outlets to abide by the law. 
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We classify networks in nine different categories according to the different relationships which 
exist in each network (appendix). 529 networks are completely integrated and 266 networks are 
predominantly integrated (table 2). These two kinds of networks realized more than the half turnover 
of networks. 
There are comparatively few groupments (143 networks only), but they represent 25 % of the 
turnover of networks, in particular because they are large networks (245 outlets on average by 
network). In opposition, franchising networks are more common - they represent 28 % of networks - 
but realize only 15 % of the turnover. Franchising networks consist in 323 mixed highly franchised 
networks and 123 mixed lightly franchised networks.  
 
 
Table 2- Relationship between outlet and upstream firm 
Kind of network Number of 
networks 
Number of outlets Turnover (million euros) 
Total Mean by 
network % Total 
Mean by 
network % 
Completely integrated 529 34 824 66 20 103 994 197 29
Mixed highly franchised 323 35 012 109 21 25 126 78 7
Predominantly integrated 266 23 306 88 14 82 565 311 23
Groupment 143 35 106 245 21 89 830 628 25
Mixed lightly franchised 123 13 314 109 8 28 874 236 8
Brand Licence 68 9 951 147 6 7 806 115 2
Other 62 8 634 139 5 5 990 97 2
Concession 57 7 350 130 4 7 199 127 2
Commission-based 
affiliation 25 2 991 120 2 1 933 78 1
Total 1 594 170 488 107100
353 
318 222100
        
Data from INSEE surveys on retail networks 2006-2007, INSEE survey on service networks 2008. 
 
 
 
II.2 Sector-based differences relating to the size of the networks 
 
The importance and the size of networks depend on the sector (table 3). The number of networks 
fluctuates between 7 and 319 among sectors; the average number of outlets by network is included 
between 27 and 377. A few sectors (in particular, clothes stores and home equipment stores) consist in 
a lot of small networks, whereas other ones (small and large-scale food retailing stores) consist in a 
few small networks. Organizational forms in networks are less present in other sectors (low number of 
networks and low number of outlets by network). 
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Table 3 - Networks and their outlets by sector (23 sectors) 
Sector Number of 
networks 
Outlets Turnovers (million 
euros) 
Total Mean by 
network Total 
Mean by 
network 
Service 
Accommodation 47 5 024 107 6 342 135 
Food and beverage service activities 88 5 129 58 7 401 84 
Travel agencies 29 2 887 100 4 596 158 
Other services activities 19 2 793 147 2 239 118 
Real estate agencies 53 7 420 140 2 526 48 
Renting (motor vehicles, personal goods) 23 4 282 186 2 907 126 
Information technology and computer service 
activities 14 380 27 143 10 
Other business service activities 79 8 809 112 23 527 298 
Personal service activities 97 7 444 77 1 993 21 
Retail 
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and sale of 
motor vehicle parts and accessories 26 5 783 222 7 453 287 
Large-scale food retailing stores 35 12 058 345 155 971 4 456 
Personal and household goods (except clothes and 
shoes) 127 18 877 149 13 017 102 
Cultural and recreation goods stores 78 8 067 103 14 041 180 
Home equipment stores 148 12 872 87 29 239 198 
Do-it-yourself stores and flower stores 80 16 061 201 32 756 409 
Department and general stores 14 956 68 5 370 384 
Small-scale food retailing stores and frozen products 
stores 24 9 050 377 9 718 405 
Retailing craft industry 25 4 174 167 619 25 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motorcycles 7 277 40 163 23 
Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in 
specialized stores 69 4 433 64 2 207 32 
Other sundry specialized retail sale 107 6 838 64 6 118 57 
Clothes stores 319 22 023 69 20 949 66 
Shoe stores 86 4 851 56 4 024 47 
Total 1 594 170 488 107 353 318 222 
Data from INSEE surveys on retail networks 2006-2007, INSEE survey on service networks 2008. 
 
II.3 A sector specific type of dominant organizational forms 
 
Each organizational form does not develop itself equally in the different sectors (graph 1). First 
of all, completely and predominantly integrated networks realize more than 20 % of the turnover of 
networks in all the sectors except two: “sale, maintenance and repair of motorcycles” and “retailing 
craft industry”. They represent more than 80 % of networks in two other sectors: “Shoe stores” and 
“other business service activities”. 
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The share of franchising is generally higher in the service sectors than in the retail sectors: this 
share exceeds 20 % in 7 of the 9 service sectors but in only 6 of the 14 retail sectors. Conversely, 
groupments are more present in the retail sectors. The share of groupments exceeds 20 % in 7 sectors. 
This share is even quite high in the small and large food retailing sector and is near 60 % in the travel 
agency sector. Thus, sectors are not composed of networks having the same organizational form. 
Nevertheless, in each sector there is only a few different forms, one or two of which are predominant. 
  
Graph 1- Distribution of turnover by kind of networks and sectors 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100
%
Sale, maintenance and repair of  motorcycles
Retailing craft industry
Personal service activities
Food and beverage service activities
Real estate agencies
Travel agencies
Small-scale food retailing stores and frozen products stores
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
Accomodation
Information technology and computer service activities
Cultural and recreation goods stores
Home equipment stores
Personal and household goods (except clothes and shoes)
Other services activities
Large-scale food retailing stores
Renting (motor vehicles, personal goods)
Other sundry specialized retail sale
Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialised stores
Do-it-yourself stores and f low er stores
Department and general stores
Clothes stores
Shoe stores
Other business service activities
Integrated (completely and predominantly) Franchised (highly and lightly) Groupment Brand licence and concession Other
 
Data from INSEE surveys on retail networks 2006-2007, INSEE survey on service networks 2008. 
 
II.4 Sector-based differences relating to the level of vertical integration 
 
This diversity is also obvious in the level of vertical integration of each network. The level of 
vertical integration is measured here by the share of turnover realized by integrated outlets (table 4). 
Only 22 % of networks have no integrated outlets. For instance, groupments are mostly composed of 
only one kind of organizational form. The level of vertical integration fluctuates among networks and 
sector. In one half of the networks, more than 65 % of the turnover is realized by integrated outlets. 
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The median share of turnover realized by integrated outlets is generally lower in the service sectors 
than the median for all the networks (except for travel agencies). This median fluctuates a lot among 
retail sectors: it is over 90 % for a few activities (clothes and shoe stores for instance) and it is under 
20 % for other ones (Small-scale food retailing stores and frozen products stores). 
 
Table 4 - Level of vertical integration by sector (23 sectors) 
Sector 
Level of vertical integration 
First 
quartile Median
Third 
quartile 
Standard 
déviation 
Shoe stores 80% 100% 100% 28% 
Department and general stores 74% 100% 100% 31% 
Personal service activities 1% 10% 41% 37% 
Other services activities 5% 60% 80% 39% 
Clothes stores 56% 92% 100% 40% 
Retailing craft industry 10% 48% 88% 41% 
Renting (motor vehicles, personal goods) 10% 40% 90% 43% 
Travel agencies 63% 100% 100% 44% 
Information technology and computer service activities 0% 11% 70% 45% 
Food and beverage service activities 12% 63% 99% 46% 
Home equipment stores 0% 10% 96% 46% 
Personal and household goods (except clothes and shoes) 0% 62% 100% 47% 
Other sundry specialized retail sale 24% 89% 100% 47% 
Accommodation 0% 55% 85% 48% 
Other business service activities 0% 38% 100% 48% 
Cultural and recreation goods stores 0% 28% 100% 48% 
Do-it-yourself stores and flower stores 0% 21% 100% 48% 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motorcycles 0% 0% 55% 48% 
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and sale of 
motor vehicle parts and accessories 0% 42% 100% 49% 
Large-scale food retailing stores 0% 83% 100% 49% 
Small-scale food retailing stores and frozen products 
stores 0% 0% 97% 49% 
Real estate agencies 0% 15% 100% 52% 
Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized 
stores 7% 57% 100% 52% 
Total 4% 65% 100% 48% 
       
Data from INSEE surveys on retail networks 2006-2007, INSEE survey on service networks 2008. 
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III. Analytical framework and hypotheses 
 
 
The survey of the literature in the framework of contract theory highlights three kinds of 
explanations for vertical integration within distribution networks that may be useful to explain the 
sector-based differences. 
The integration level of a network can be seen i) as transitory (capital constraint theory, signal 
theory), ii) as the result of localized decisions concerning the downstream units (unilateral moral-
hazard theory), iii) as the result of a global strategy from the upstream (transaction cost theory, 
multitask model, two-sided moral hazard model). 
 
III.1 Contract-mix and network integration level as transitory 
 
Since Caves and Murphy (1976), capital constraint is a main argument to explain franchising 
versus owning, or in other words to explain the development of non-fully integrated distribution 
networks. The downstream units are seen as financial and human capital providers enabling a fast and 
wide development of the network. In this framework, the choice to exploit a brand name through 
independent retailers instead of owned units would be due to the lack of maturity of the upstream firm. 
This explanation involves that the chain would become more and more integrated with maturity.  
The mix of vertical contracts within a distribution network is also considered as transitory in the 
theory of signal based, concerning franchising, on Gallini and Lutz (1992)’s model. In the context of 
an information asymmetry relating to the value of the upstream firm’s brand name, the franchisor may 
operate directly some downstream units. It is a way to signal the brand name value, being involved in 
its exploitation. With maturity, the chain reputation gets stronger and owned units are less required. 
Here again, the mix of vertical contracts and the network integration level is seen as transitory, but the 
evolution would be reverse to the one expected with the explanation in terms of capital constraint: 
with maturity the chain would be less integrated. 
Whatever the evolution, in these kinds of explanations the mix of vertical contracts is just 
transitory in the chain development, and the level of integration at a given time reflects the maturity of 
the network. 
Two hypotheses relating to the sector-based differences result from this framework: 
 
 
H1: The integration level differs because the sectors do not have the same maturity 
 
H2: The integration level differs because the sectors do not have the same constraints 
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III.2 Contract-mix and network integration level as the result of localized decisions 
 
The unilateral principal-agent model offers another explanation of contract-mix and integration 
level in distribution chains. This explanation is rooted in the theoretical foundations relating to vertical 
restraints (Mathewson and Winter 1984, 1985; Rey and Tirole 1986). It finds an empirical support in 
the econometrical literature on franchising data (initially: Brickley 1999, Bercovitz 2000, Arrunada 
et al., 2001; more recently: Barthélémy, 2011). 
The bilateral vertical relationship within a distribution network involves a moral hazard relating to 
a potential opportunistic behavior on the downstream side. The retailers of a distribution network 
share the same brand name. This involves a potential free-riding on the promotional effort. For each 
new retailer, the upstream firm faces a choice about the way it will expand the network: owned unit 
versus independent retailer with a vertical contract as franchising. This choice reflects a trade-off 
between incentive and control. In the moral hazard situation, higher incentives come from independent 
retailers, but better control is possible with integrated units. The upstream choice concerning each 
downstream unit is motivated by the local conditions regarding the monitoring costs and the level of 
the potential free-riding. Therefore, in this framework, the integration level of the network at some 
point is just the result of the aggregation of localized decisions. The heterogeneity of the local 
conditions involves the heterogeneity of the vertical contracts in the chain. 
The introduction of a sector-based dimension in this analytical framework justifies the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H3: The integration level differs because the sectors are more or less composed of heterogeneous 
local conditions 
 
 
III.3 Contract-mix and network integration as the result of a global strategy 
 
A third explanation of contract-mix and integration level within the distribution networks is based 
on the transaction costs theory and on more complex principal-agent models, with two sided-moral 
hazard or multi-tasks agents. This explanation draws attention to the complementarities between 
owned units and independent retailers in the network. 
The transaction costs theory highlights the role of specific assets as a key determinant of 
integration. As reminded by Lafontaine and Slade (2010) in their survey relating to the analysis of 
distribution contracts in the framework of this theory, within a network the brand name is the main 
specific asset from the upstream firm. 
This input is taken into account in the explanation in terms of two-sided moral-hazard. According 
to Scott (1995) the presence of owned units in the network is an incentive mechanism for the upstream 
10 
 
firm to invest in the brand name, as for the royalty rate. The higher the proportion of owned units in 
the network is, the more the upstream firm is incited to maintain the network reputation, because it is 
directly involved. Considering that the networks with a strong brand name capital have a higher level 
of integration (rate of owned units), Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) analyze the operating of owned units 
as a way to better control the retailers regarding the potential degradation of the brand name.  
Bai and Tao (2000) adapt the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)’s multitasks model to study 
retailing as a two tasks activity requiring i) an effort to maintain the brand name value and ii) an effort 
to sale. In this context the coexistence of owned units and independent retailers in the same network is 
considered as a strategy of the upstream firm.  
In this framework, a sector-based approach involves the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: The integration level differs because the involvement of the upstream firm is different among 
sectors 
 
 
 
 
IV. Sample and empirical specifications 
 
 
IV.1 The sample 
 
The sample consists of the 1075 networks in the three main organizational forms: integrated 
networks, franchised networks and groupments (graph 2). The distribution of these networks in the 23 
sectors is presented in table 5. 
 
 
 
Graph 2- Distribution of the three organizational forms in the sample 
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Table 5- 1075 networks, 23 sectors 
 
Sector 
 
 
Number of 
networks  
 
% 
in 
sample 
 
Type of 
PRODUCT 
 
 
RETAIL/SERVICE 
Accommodation 32        3.0 Anomal Service 
Food and beverage service activities 62        5.8 Banal Service 
Travel agencies 20        1.9 Anomal Service 
Other services activities  16       1.5 Anomal Service 
Real estate agencies 31        2.9 Anomal Service 
Renting (motor vehicles, personal goods) 18        1.7 Anomal Service 
Information technology and computer 
service activities 
7         
0.7 
Anomal Service 
Other business service activities 59        5.5 Anomal Service 
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
and sale of motor vehicle parts and 
accessories 
17        
1.6 
Anomal Retail 
Large-scale food retailing stores 29        2.7 Banal Retail 
Personal service activities 63        5.9 Banal Service 
Personal and household goods (except 
clothes and shoes) 
99        
9.2 
Anomal Retail 
Cultural and recreation goods stores 62        5.8 Anomal Retail 
Home equipment stores 84        7.8 Anomal Retail 
Do-it-yourself stores and flower stores 65        6.0 Banal Retail 
Department and general stores 12        1.1 Anomal Retail 
Small-scale food retailing stores and 
frozen products stores 
20        
1.9 
Banal Retail 
Retailing craft industry 17        1.6 Banal Retail 
Sale, maintenance and repair of 
motorcycles 
       5         
0.5 
Anomal Retail 
Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco 
in specialized stores 
40        
3.7 
Banal Retail 
Other sundry specialized retail sale 70        6.5 Anomal Retail 
Clothes stores 177       16.5 Banal Retail 
Shoe stores 70        6.5 Banal Retail 
 
 
IV.2 Dependent variables 
 
Three variables are taken into account to study the networks organizational choices: the integration 
rate, the choice for an integrated network, and the dominant type of organization. These variables are 
defined in table 6. 
Table 6 - Three dependent variables 
  
Variable  Definition  Type  
 
OWNEDRATE  
 
 
Integration rate of the network : 
Turnover of the owned units / Total turnover of the network  
 
Quantitative  
variable 
 
INTEGRETED  
  
Choice for an integrated network: 
 Mainly or fully integrated network versus groupments and 
franchised networks  
 
Dummy variable 
 
NETYPE  
 
Dominant type of organization : 
groupment, franchised network, integrated network  
 
Ordered multinomial 
variable 
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IV.3. Core explanatory variables 
 
 
Table 7 presents the explanatory variables derived from the analytical framework. 
 
 
Table 7 - Definition and summary statistics for the core explanatory variables 
Variable  Definition     Mean            Std. Dev.            Min            Max  Type  Related Hypothesis Analytical 
Framework 
 
AGE  
 
Age of the network  
23.63163 21.70479 0 205 
 
Quantitative 
variable  
 
H1: The integration level differs because the 
sectors do not have the same maturity 
 
 
Theory of 
signal 
 
RETAILSER 
 
Retail 
versus Services (0/1) 0.28651163 
 
0.73885337 
 
0 1 
 
Dummy 
variable 
 
H2: The integration level differs because the 
sectors do not have the same constraints 
  
 
Capital 
constraints 
 
SIZE 
 
Size of the network :  
Number of outlets in France  
113.848372 
 
259.232232 
 
7 60.55 
 
Quantitative 
variable 
 
H3: the sectors are more or less composed 
of heterogeneous units 
 
 
Agency theory 
 
K-MARK 
 
 
Proxy variable for the 
involvement of the upstream 
firm  
 
7.169302 4.29143 0 12 
 
Multinomial 
ordered 
variable  
 
H4: The integration level differs because the 
involvement of the upstream firm is different 
among sectors 
 
Transaction 
costs theory 
Agency theory 
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The proxy variable K-MARK is constructed with six qualitative variables. Each of them has been 
re-coded from 0-2 (0 = no, 1 = yes partially, 2 = yes totally): the higher this variable, the higher the 
involvement of the upstream firm in the vertical relationship. 
 
Table 8 - Construction of the proxy variable K-MARK 
 
Aggregation of the six following qualitative variables : 
 
Design of the retail outlet 
Teams training 
Launch of advertizing and promotion 
Definition of offered  services to customers 
Sales tracking 
Spreading information concerning the performance of retailers in the network 
For information : minimum : 0 maximum : 12 
 
 
 
IV.4. Control variables 
 
The three control variables presented in table 9 are included in the models. 
Considering that the type of product characterizing the sector may explain some organizational 
choices, the variable PRODUCT is constructed taken into account the distinction of two kinds of 
products: banal versus anomal (table 10). 
Two structural variables control for the influence of a mono versus a multi network(s) upstream 
firm (MOMUL) and of a financial control of the upstream firm by the network members (CONTRO). 
 
Table 9 - Control variables 
Variable  Definition Type  
PRODUCT  Type of product : banal/anomal (0 /1) Dummy variable 
MOMUL  The upstream firm has only one versus several 
networks (0/1) 
Dummy variable 
CONTRO  Control of the head by network members Dummy variable 
 
 
Table 10 - Construction of the proxy variable PRODUCT 
 
BANAL (432 networks) ANOMAL (643 networks) 
Low costs 
Automatic purchase 
High frequency purchase 
High costs 
Well-thought-out purchase 
High research costs 
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V. Estimations 
 
We estimate the three following econometric models to study the influence of the sector-based 
explanations i) on the integration rate (linear regression [1]), ii) on the binary choice for an integrated 
network versus a mixed network (probit model [2]), iii) on the dominant type of organization (ordered 
probit model [3]). Sector dummies are included.  
 
 
Equation for the integration rate: 
 
 OWNEDRATEi = 
α0 + α1 AGE i + α2 RETAILSERi + α3 SIZEi + α4 KMARK i +α5 PRODUCTi +α6 MOMUL i +α7 CONTRO i +       
 α8 SECTOR i + ε i      [1]   i = {1, …, 1075}     
    
 
 
Equation for the choice “integration versus alternative vertical organization”: 
 
prob (INTEGRETEDi = 1| Xi) =  
α0 + α1 AGE i + α2 RETAILSERi + α3 SIZEi + α4 KMARK i +α5 PRODUCTi +α6 MOMUL i +α7 CONTRO i +       
 α8 SECTOR i + ε i      [2]   i = {1, …, 1075}     
 
 
 
Integration level of the network: 
 
 NETYPE*i =  
 α0 + α1 AGE i + α2 RETAILSERi + α3 SIZEi + α4 KMARK i +α5 PRODUCTi +α6 MOMUL i +α7 CONTRO i +              
 α8 SECTOR i i + ε i      [3]   i = {1, …, 1075}     
 
 
 
where NETYPE * = latent variable denoting the integration level of the network 
and    NETYPE = observed variable: organizational form of the network ie type of dominant contract 
  
with  NETYPE =0  Groupment 
   NETYPE =1  Franchised network 
  NETYPE =2  Integrated network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∑
=
23
1s
∑
=
23
1s
∑
=
23
1s
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The estimation results are reported in tables 11 and 12 (see also appendix 2).  
 
 
Table 11- Estimation results (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Probit Oprobit 
    
AGE 0.00350*** 0.0132*** 0.0116*** 
 (0.000516) (0.00316) (0.00281) 
    
RETAILSER -0.0241 -0.231 0.121 
 (0.0480) (0.154) (0.148) 
    
SIZE -0.000244*** -0.00120*** -0.00125*** 
 (0.0000714) (0.000343) (0.000281) 
    
KMARK 0.0213*** 0.0644*** 0.0716*** 
 (0.00433) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
    
PRODUCT -0.0556* -0.205* -0.333*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0831) (0.0754) 
    
MOMUL -0.0467 -0.110 -0.233 
 (0.0351) (0.119) (0.120) 
    
CONTRO 0.0422** 0.103* 0.258*** 
 
 
(0.0142) (0.0463) (0.0464) 
 
Sector dummies no no no 
    
_cons 0.450*** -0.259  
 
 
(0.0690) (0.229) 
 
 
cut1    
_cons   -0.922*** 
   (0.234) 
cut2    
_cons   0.371 
   (0.231) 
Prob > F  or chi2     
R2 or Pseudo R2 
0.0000 
0.1455 
0.0000 
0.1236 
0.0000 
0.1041 
           Standard errors in brackets 
                 *
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The good global significance level of the three models (Fisher or Chi 2 probabilities) suggests that 
the analytical framework is relevant. 
In the majority of cases the results are qualitatively similar (significance and sign of the 
parameters) in the three models. This enables to conclude for robustness.  
Three of the four core explanatory variables have a significant impact on the organizational 
choices. As predicted by the explanation in terms of signal theory (H1), the maturity of the network 
has a positive significant influence on the integration level: integration rate, choice for an integrated 
network, dominant contract type in the network from the less integrating to the more integrating. This 
result is reverse to the prediction from the explanation in terms of capital constraint. This is consistent 
with the estimates relating to the variable RETAILSER (H2) whose influence is only significant in the 
probit and ordered probit models table 12. Consistent with the explanation from the agency theory 
(H3), the size of the network impacts negatively the level of network integration. As predicted, the 
mix of different types of vertical contracts within a same distribution network appears to be related to 
a high number of outlets. Finally, the hypothesis related to the brand-name value deriving from the 
transaction costs and the agency theories (H4) finds also an empirical support here. The involvement 
of the upstream firm influences positively the network integration level. 
Concerning the control variables, the variable PRODUCT, directly related to a sector-based 
explanation, has a significant influence in all the estimations except in the probit model table 12. The 
variable MOMUL has no significant impact; this is the reverse with the variable CONTRO whose 
positive influence suggests that the control of the upstream firm by the network members is related 
with the most integrated vertical systems. 
The models are estimated twice, without (table 11) and with (table 12) sector dummies. Appendix 2 
presents the detailed results including the sector dummies.  In the three models the estimation results 
are robust, but the global significance (R²) is clearly higher when they include sector dummies, 
suggesting that the sector-based explanation is relevant. The sector influence involves that the variable 
PRODUCT is not enough (far from it in view of the significance levels) to justify the integration 
choices. The explanation would be more in the nature of the product or service being sold. On the 
other hand, the impact of the sector dummies shows that some characteristics related to the integration 
behaviors are not analyzed by the theory of contracts. For example, logistics, supply, computer links 
needed between outlets (etc.) are, indirectly, but only taken into account by means of the sector. The 
observed diversity of the organizational choices between the sectors would not only be explained by 
the differences between the networks that constitute the sectors (in terms of age, size, involvement of 
the upstream firm, control of the upstream firm by the retailers), but also because the sectors 
themselves are different.  
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Table 12- Estimation results (2) 
 
        
Standard errors in bracket 
 *
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See appendix 2 for detailed estimations. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Probit Oprobit 
    
AGE 0.00281*** 0.0110*** 0.0082*** 
 (0.000547) (0.00234) (0.00211) 
    
RETAILSER -0.1399 -1.1803*** -0.866** 
 (0.076) (0.326) (0.308) 
    
SIZE -0.000272** -0.00038** -0.000073** 
 (9.61e-6) (0.000118) (0.000028) 
    
KMARK 0.0201*** 0.0632*** 0.0718*** 
 (0.00403) (0.0147) (0.0134) 
    
PRODUCT -0.172* -0.456 -0.826** 
 (0.082) (0.298) (0.251) 
    
MOMUL -0.0517 -0.096 -0.231* 
 (0.0340) (0.126) (0.115) 
    
CONTRO 0.0455** 0.120* 0.278*** 
 
 
(0.01347) 
 
(0.0497) (0.0454) 
Sector dummies1               yes                yes                   yes 
    
_cons 0.642*** 0.686*  
 (0.0804) (0.349)  
cut1    
_cons   -1.950*** 
   (0.333) 
cut2    
_cons   -0.604 
   (0.330) 
Prob > F  or chi2     
R2 or Pseudo R2 
0.0000 
0.2235 
0.0000 
0.2039 
0.0000 
0.1436 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Based on recent data concerning the French distribution networks in retail and services, this paper 
highlights several stylized facts relating to the sector-based differences in the organizational choices. 
Until now this issue has not been studied in the economical literature. 
This paper provides an analytical framework derived from the theory of contracts, and evidence for 
the French case with three econometrical models concerning the contract-mix and the networks 
integration levels. The estimations show that the maturity of the sectors, the level of heterogeneous 
local conditions, the degree of involvement of the upstream firm as well as the type of product are part 
of the explanation for the sector-based differences in the organizational choices. However the paper 
highlights also some limitations in the explanations deriving from the economic theory. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
In INSEE’s surveys, nine kinds of relationship between outlets and the upstream firm are considered 
(from most integrated to most independent):  
- Integrated outlets which belong to the upstream firm or to one’s subsidiary; 
- Franchising outlets; 
- Outlets with licence brand contract; 
- Outlets with commission-based affiliation contract; 
- Outlets with concession contract; 
- Outlets with lease-management contract; 
- Outlets member of central buying service or central referencing service which do not have the brand 
name of the network; 
- Outlets member of groupment; 
- Outlets with other relationships. 
 
Several networks usually have distinct relationships with their different outlets. In order to 
characterize these different relationships inside each network, the INSEE allocates to each network a 
type according to the share of turnover realized by each kind of outlets. The different kinds of network 
are given in the following table; the algorithm tests successively the condition in the second column of 
the table and stops as soon as a condition is true. 
 
Table appendix 1: The different kinds of network 
Kind of network Conditions 
Completely integrated 100 % of turnover is realized by integrated outlets 
Mixed highly franchised More than 50 % of turnover is realized by franchising outlets 
Mixed lightly franchised Between 20 % and 50 % of turnover is realized by franchising outlets 
Predominantly integrated More than 50 % of turnover is realized by integrated outlets 
Groupment More than 50 % of turnover is realized by outlets member of groupment 
Brand Licence More than 50 % of turnover is realized by outlets with brand licence 
contract 
Commission-based 
affiliation 
More than 50 % of turnover is realized by outlets with commission-based 
affiliation contract 
Concession More than 50 % of turnover is realized by outlets with concession contract 
Other Other networks 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Probit Oprobit 
    
AGE 0.00281*** 0.0110*** 0.0082*** 
 (0.000547) (0.00234) (0.00211) 
    
RETAILSER -0.1399 -1.1803*** -0.866** 
 (0.076) (0.326) (0.308) 
    
SIZE -0.000272** -0.00038** -0.000073** 
 (9.61e-6) (0.000118) (0.000028) 
    
KMARK 0.0201*** 0.0632*** 0.0718*** 
 (0.00403) (0.0147) (0.0134) 
    
PRODUCT -0.172* -0.456 -0.826** 
 (0.082) (0.298) (0.251) 
    
MOMUL -0.0517 -0.096 -0.231* 
 (0.0340) (0.126) (0.115) 
    
CONTRO 0.0455** 0.120* 0.278*** 
 
 
(0.01347) 
 
(0.0497) (0.0454) 
Travel agencies2 0.377*** 
(0.1074) 
1.395** 
(0.4052) 
1.3537*** 
(0.3588) 
 
  
 
Other services 
activities 
0.078 
(0.1148) 
 
0.4052 
(0.3999) 
0.5426 
(0.3502) 
Real estate agencies 0.0265 
(0.0946) 
0.4629 
(0.3439) 
0.6087* 
(0.2892) 
 
   
Renting (motor 
vehicles, personal 
goods) 
0.1221 
(0.1129) 
0.4047 
(0.4026) 
0.5640 
(0.3411) 
 
   
Information 
technology and 
computer service 
activities 
0.066 
(0.1562) 
0.0151 
(0.5672) 
0.2439 
(0.4719) 
 
   
Other business 
service activities 
0.1311 
(0.0831) 
0.4996 
(0.2973) 
0.6603** 
(0.2532) 
 
   
Maintenance and 
repair of motor 
vehicles and sale of 
motor vehicle parts 
and accessories 
 
-0.1627 
(0.1332) 
 
-1.1113* 
(0.5061) 
 
-0.8221 
(0.4555) 
 
   
Large-scale food 
retailing stores 
-0.0995 
(0.0960) 
-0.7155 
(0.4055) 
-0.8699* 
(0.3834) 
                                                 
2
 The sectors “Accommodation” and “Food and beverage” are regrouped for these estimations and serve as a 
reference for the service activities; the sector “Shoe stores” is the reference for retail.  
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Personal service 
activities 
-0.3658*** 
(0.0672) 
-1.1756*** 
(0.2787) 
-0.6622*** 
(0.2027) 
 
   
Personal and 
household goods 
-0.1391 
(0.1025) 
-0.8700* 
(0.4134) 
-0.7442* 
(0.3732) 
 
   
Cultural and 
recreation goods 
stores 
-0.1413 
(0.1069) 
-0.9017* 
(0.4274) 
-0.7898* 
(0.3855) 
 
   
Home equipment 
stores 
-0.1451 
(0.1038) 
-1.1475** 
(0.4161) 
-0.8610* 
(0.3754) 
 
   
Do-it-yourself stores 
and flower stores 
-0.3390*** 
(0.0664) 
-1.4790*** 
(0.3020) 
-1.6412*** 
(0.2884) 
 
   
Department and 
general stores 
0.0309 
(0.1463) 
-0.0244 
(0.6726) 
0.3383 
(0.6403) 
 
   
Small-scale food 
retailing stores and 
frozen products stores 
-0.4220*** 
(0.1104) 
-1.4457** 
(0.4377) 
-1.7117*** 
(0.3978) 
 
   
Retailing craft 
industry 
-0.2856** 
(0.1009) 
-1.6827*** 
(0.3963) 
-1.4147*** 
(0.3686) 
 
   
Sale, maintenance 
and repair of 
motorcycles 
-0.3993* 
(0.1927) 
-1.8043* 
(0.7286) 
-1.1756* 
(0.6053) 
 
   
Retail sale of food, 
beverages and 
tobacco in specialized 
stores 
-0.2640*** 
(0.0742) 
-1.3530*** 
(0.3205) 
-1.3250*** 
(0.3104) 
 
   
Other sundry 
specialized retail sale 
-0.0215 
(0.1047) 
-0.7105 
(0.4205) 
-0.4545 
(0.3814) 
 
   
Clothes stores 
-0.1023* 
(0.0531) 
-0.5779* 
(0.2741) 
-0.6716* 
(0.2672) 
 
 
  
_cons 0.642*** 0.686*  
 (0.0804) (0.349)  
cut1    
_cons   -1.950*** 
   (0.333) 
cut2    
_cons   -0.604 
   (0.330) 
Prob > F  or chi2      0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.2235 0.2039 0.1436 
 Standard errors in brackets 
                      *
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
